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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND SECURITY DETENTION
Doug Cassel*
This article analyzes the grounds, procedures, and conditions re-
quired by International Human Rights Law for preventive detention of sus-
pected terrorists as threats to security. Such detention is generally permit-
ted, provided it is based on grounds and procedures previously established 
by law; is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or disproportionate; is publicly 
registered and subject to fair and effective judicial review; and the detainee 
is not mistreated and is compensated for any unlawful detention. In Europe, 
however, preventive detention for security purposes is generally not permit-
ted.  If allowed at all, it is permitted only when a State in time of national 
emergency formally derogates from the right to liberty under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The article concludes that if preventive de-
tention for security purposes is to be allowed at all, its use must be kept to 
an absolute minimum, and the European model should be followed, allow-
ing detention only by formal derogation during national emergency, and 
then only to the extent and for the time strictly required. 
INTRODUCTION 
[I]f so-called preventive detention is used, for reasons of public security, 
 . . . it must not be arbitrary, and must be based on grounds and proce-
dures established by law . . . , information of the reasons must be given . . . 
and court control of the detention must be available . . . as well as com-
pensation  in the case of a breach . . . .1
Although written a quarter century ago and limited to one treaty—
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—these words of the 
Human Rights Committee capture most of what might now be described as 
the “consensus” of international human rights law (IHRL) instruments with 
regard to constraints on security detention.2
 *  Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Civil and Human Rights, Notre Dame 
Law School.  
   1 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 8: Right to Liberty and Securi-
ty of Persons, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (June 30, 1982) [hereinafter HRC GC 8]. 
2  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368, 
Dec. 16, 1966 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
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By “security detention,” I refer to detention of persons detained 
preventively as threats to security.3  I thus exclude detention for purposes of 
criminal prosecution (which would trigger additional international rights, 
such as the right to speedy trial or release).4 All elements of the “consensus” 
of norms outlined below also apply to detention for purposes of deportation 
or expulsion on security grounds (although, under both international and 
domestic law, additional requirements apply to immigration-related deten-
tions).5
In most cases, the “consensus” of norms in IHRL instruments appli-
cable to security detentions may represent customary international law.  
However, this “consensus” does not consider the extent of state practice and 
opinio juris to determine whether all elements of the consensus amount to 
customary law. 
Where security detention is permitted—outside Europe—the con-
sensus of IHRL instruments is that security detention must comply with the 
following requirements: 
Grounds. The detention must not be arbitrary and must be based on 
grounds previously established by law. 
Procedures.  The detention must be based on procedures previously 
established by law and: 
oMust be subject to prompt and effective judicial control, at least 
on the initiative of the detainee; 
oMust inform the detainee of the reasons for his detention and, if 
he is foreign, of his right to communicate with his consulate for 
assistance;
oMust not be incommunicado for more than a few days;  
oMust be registered; and 
oMust afford the detainee a fair judicial hearing on the lawful-
ness of his detention. 
Extent. The detention must be proportional; it must be no more re-
strictive or prolonged than strictly required by the exigencies of the 
security situation. 
3 This excludes persons detained for interrogation as possible material witnesses in con-
nection with criminal proceedings, which in the US are governed by statute.  See generally
U.S. v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003); 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2007).  It also excludes 
persons detained exclusively or primarily for purposes of interrogation for intelligence pur-
poses.  Such detention probably qualifies as “arbitrary” and thus is not permitted by IHRL. 
See U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Situation of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, ¶¶ 20, 
23, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 27, 2006).  
4 ICCPR, supra note 2, at art. 14. 
5 ICCPR, supra note 2, at art. 13. 
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Equality. The detention must be non-discriminatory, including as be-
tween citizens and foreigners. 
Treatment of Detainee. Must be humane and with access to regular 
medical evaluation and treatment. 
Compensation. The detainee must have a right to be compensated for 
unlawful detention. 
Other International Law. The detention must comply with all other 
applicable requirements of international law, including, in armed con-
flict, International Humanitarian Law (IHL). 
Provided these requirements are satisfied, IHRL (outside Europe) 
permits security detention. Inside Europe, security detention is not permitted 
except, if at all, by derogation from the European Convention on Human 
Rights. This state of the law merits further reflection: is security detention 
really necessary? Should there be, at least, higher threshold standards re-
quired to justify it? 
Additional gaps in current IHRL include the level and quality of in-
formation or evidence required to justify security detention; the need for 
explicit requirements for periodic administrative and judicial review; and 
the lack of clarity, uniformity, and certainty in existing IHRL requirements.   
I derive the elements of this IHRL consensus on security detention 
from the following instruments: 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),6
joined by 162 States Parties;7
Universal Declaration of Human Rights8 (UDHR) (largely evidence 
of customary international law);9
United Nations Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),10 joined by 145 States 
Parties;11
6 ICCPR, supra note 2. 
7 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratification 
Table: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (updated Sept. 23, 2008), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/4.htm. 
8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/180 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
9 See Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts,
54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 394–96 (1985) (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or at least 
some of its provisions including right to liberty and freedom from arbitrary detention, widely 
regarded as customary international law). 
10 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 93rd plen. mtg., (Dec. 10, 1984). 
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United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons 
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment12 (arguably evidence 
of customary international law); 13 and 
Regional instruments: 
oEuropean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),14 joined by 
47 States Parties;15
oAmerican Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),16 joined by 
24 States Parties;17
oAmerican Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
(ADHR),18 an “authoritative interpretation” of the human rights 
commitments in the Charter of the Organization of American 
States (OAS),19 used by the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights as the yardstick to monitor all American States that 
are not parties to the ACHR;20 and 
                                                     
11 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (up-
dated Oct. 2, 2007), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/9.htm. 
12 United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR 76th plen. mtg., (Dec. 9, 1988) 
[hereinafter Body of Principles].
13 Many provisions of the Body of Principles appear in numerous IHRL instruments as 
well, including those discussed in this article. 
14 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 232 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
15 See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms (updated Nov. 4, 2008), http:/conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/Cherche 
Sig.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=4/112008&CL=ENG.
16 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR].   
17 See B-32: American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Puerto Rico,”
http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/sigs/b-32.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2008). 
18 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (adopted by the Ninth International Conference of Ameri-
can States, Bogota, Colombia, May 2, 1948) [hereinafter ADHR]. 
19 Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 1952 U.N.T.S. 48; 
Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the 
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion 
OC-10/89, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 43 (July 14, 1989), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4j.htm.  
20 See Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 19, Oct. 1979, 
available at  http://www.cidh.org/basicos/English/Basic17.Statute%20of%20the%20 
Commission.htm. In March 2008, after this article was completed, the Commission adopted 
new guidelineson detentions, which are not incorporated into the analysis in this article, but 
which are consistent with it. Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons 
Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. 1/08, (Mar. 13, 2008). 
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oAfrican Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR),21
joined by 53 States Parties.22
This IHRL consensus applies in both peace and war (although in 
war it may be modified by the lex specialis of IHL).23  Also, despite objec-
tions by the U.S.24 and Israel,25 the IHRL consensus also governs a State’s 
extraterritorial detentions of persons within the effective custody and con-
trol of the State.26 This does not extend, however, to extraterritorial deten-
tions carried out by state forces acting for the United Nations under a Chap-
ter VII Security Council mandate.27
GROUNDS FOR SECURITY DETENTION
A. Everywhere but Europe 
Outside Europe, the IHRL consensus on the grounds for security 
detention can be stated in two simple points. First, the detention must not be 
arbitrary.28 Second, the detention must be on grounds previously established 
21 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 218 
[hereinafter ACHPR]. 
22 See OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols, Charters,
http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Documents/Treaties/treaties.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 
2008).
23 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 137, ¶ 106 (July 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf [hereinafter ICJ Wall]. 
24 Brief of Respondent at 38–39, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 1286 (2004); United States 
Report to UN Human Rights Committee on Compliance with International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1995); Annex I: Territorial Application of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.   
25 See ICJ Wall, supra note 23, ¶ 110. 
26 See id. ¶ 111; U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter HRC GC 31]. 
27 See Behrami v. France, EUR. CT. H.R., App. No. 71412/01, ¶ 144–52 (2007), available
at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB861 
42BF01C1166DEA398649&key=62605&sessionID=1033379&skin=hudoc-en&attachmen 
t=true. 
28 ICCPR, supra note 2, at art. 9(1); UDHR, supra note 8, ¶ 9; ACHR, supra note 16, at 
art. 6; ADHR, supra note 18, at art. 25 (“No person may be deprived of his liberty except in 
the cases and according to the procedures established by pre-existing law”).  Although pro-
tection against arbitrary detention is not made explicit in Article 5 of the ECHR, it is doubt-
less implicit. E.g., Aksoy v. Turkey 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2261, 2282 (“Judicial control of 
interferences by the executive with the individual's right to liberty is an essential feature of 
the guarantee embodied in Article 5(3), which is intended to minimize the risk of arbitrari-
ness and to ensure the rule of law.”). 
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by law.29 An early formulation by the Human Rights Committee, quoted at 
the outset of this article, explicitly contemplates security detention, albeit 
subject to conditions: 
[I]f so-called preventive detention is used, for reasons of public security,    
. . . it must not be arbitrary, and must be based on grounds and procedures 
established by law . . . , information of the reasons must be given . . . and 
court control of the detention must be available . . . as well as compensa-
tion  in the case of a breach . . . . 30
A recent report by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights similarly recognizes that deprivation of liberty may be justified in 
connection with the “administration of state authority” outside the criminal 
justice context, “where measures of this nature are strictly necessary.” 31
Generally, under IHRL, the question is not whether security deten-
tion is permitted, but on what grounds, pursuant to what procedures, and 
under what conditions such detention would be acceptable. 
A notable gap in current IHRL is the absence of a standard for the 
extent or quality of evidence needed to justify a security detention.  The 
requirement that the detention not be “arbitrary” means that there must be 
some reason or evidentiary basis for the detention. But how much? Should 
the legal standard be “reasonable suspicion”?  Or “some evidence”?  Or 
“probable cause”?  Something else?  What about the evidentiary basis?  If a 
“some evidence” standard is too low,32 how much more should be required? 
And should the standard be the same for the initial arrest and the 
subsequent, possibly prolonged detention? As the detention extends beyond 
a brief period—months to years—the deprivation of liberty correspondingly 
becomes more serious. Should the standard for continued detention there-
fore be higher than for initial detention? 
29 ICCPR, supra note 2, at art. 9(1); ACHR, supra note 16, at art. 7(2) (stating “[n]o one 
shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons . . . established beforehand by 
the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.”), 
ACHPR, supra note 21, at art. 6 (“No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons 
. . . previously laid down by law.”), ADHR, supra note 18, at art. 25 (“No person may be 
deprived of his liberty except in the cases and according to the procedures established by pre-
existing law.”). 
30 HRC GC 8, supra note 1, ¶ 4. 
31 Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/VII.116, doc. 5, rev. 1, corr. 22, 
¶ 124 (2002), available at http://cidh.org/Terrorism/Eng/part.d.htm [hereinafter Report on 
Terrorism and Human Rights]. 
32 Hamdi v. Rumsfled, 542 U.S. 509, 537 (2004) (stating “some evidence” standard is 
“inadequate”; it is a “standard of review, not a standard of proof”). 
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B.          Europe 
In Europe the picture is more complicated. ECHR Article 5, which 
guarantees the right to liberty, prohibits security detention.  But can security 
detention be permitted by derogation from Article 5? 
In its very first judgment in 1961, the European Court of Human 
Rights upheld Ireland’s security detention of an IRA activist, carried out by 
derogation from Article 5.33 More than four decades later, however, the 
British Law Lords interpreted the ECHR, and the jurisprudence of the Eu-
ropean Court, to rule that a British security detention law enacted by dero-
gation from Article 5 failed to meet the tests of proportionality and non-
discrimination required of derogations, and was thus incompatible with the 
ECHR.34 In light of the recent British ruling, it is unclear whether prolonged 
security detention can still be justified by derogation from the ECHR. 
1. Right to liberty under the ECHR 
Unlike the other IHRL instruments surveyed here, the ECHR enu-
merates an exclusive list of permissible grounds for detention.  Article 5(1) 
provides that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following 
cases . . . .”35  It then lists six grounds.36 Of the six grounds, however, only 
two are plausibly relevant to security detention. However, neither was in-
tended, or has been interpreted, to permit security detention.   
One of these provisions is Article 5.1 (b), which authorizes deten-
tion “in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law.”  
This refers, however, to a specific legal obligation, such as the duty to per-
form military service or file a tax return.37 Article 5.1(b) does not extend to 
“obligations to comply with the law generally, so that it does not justify 
preventive detention of the sort that a state might introduce in an emergency 
situation.”38
33 Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 62 (1961). 
34 See A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56 (appeal taken 
from England and Wales) (permitting “the appeals, quash[ing] the derogation order, and 
declar[ing] section 23 of the 2001 Act incompatible with the right to liberty in article 5(1) of 
the European Convention”). 
35 ECHR, supra note 14, at art. 5.1(c) 
36 See id. (showing that the six grounds include conviction by a court, non-compliance 
with court order or to secure fulfillment of a legal obligation, reasonable suspicion of crime 
or when reasonably necessary to prevent a crime or flight following crime, detention of a 
minor for educational or juvenile justice purposes, detention on medical or drug-related 
grounds or on grounds of incompetence or vagrancy, and immigration-related detentions). 
37 DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE & CHRIS WARBRICK, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 112–13 (Butterworths 1995). 
38 Id. at 113 (citing Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 51). 
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The other facially relevant provision is Article 5.1(c), which autho-
rizes detention “when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent [a 
person’s] committing an offence.” However, this provision “concerns only 
detention in the enforcement of the criminal law.”39
In the 1961 Lawless judgment, the European Court of Human 
Rights considered the detention of an IRA activist for five months under an 
Irish statute, activated only in emergencies, that authorized a Minister of 
State to order an arrest and detention whenever the Minister “is of opinion 
that any particular person is engaged in activities which, in his opinion, are 
prejudicial to the preservation of public peace and order or to the security of 
the State.”40 The Minister of Justice ordered Lawless detained under this 
statute because Lawless was, “in his opinion, engaged in activities prejudi-
cial to the security of the State.”41
Considering whether Lawless’s detention was justified by Article 
5.1(c) of the ECHR, the Court ruled that it was not.42 Harris et al. explain 
that even though the language of Article 5.1(c) 
at first sight . . . could be read as authorizing a general power of preventive 
detention . . . [t]his interpretation was rejected in Lawless v. Ireland, as 
‘leading to conclusions repugnant to the fundamental principles of the 
Convention.’ Ruling that the wording ‘for the purpose of bringing him be-
fore the competent legal authority’ applied to all three of the limbs of Ar-
ticle 5(1)(c), the Court rejected the defendant government’s argument that 
the detention of the applicant, a suspected IRA activist, under a statute that 
permitted the internment of persons ‘engaged in activities . . . prejudicial 
to the . . . security of the state,’ could be justified as being ‘necessary to 
prevent his committing an offence.’  This was because the detention of an 
interned person under the statute was not effected with the purpose of in-
itiating a criminal prosecution.43
In this judgment, signed by René Cassin, the Court repudiated secu-
rity detention in strong terms. The Court warned that if its restrictive con-
struction of Article 5.1(c) were incorrect,  
anyone suspected of harbouring an intent to commit an offence could be 
arrested and detained for an unlimited period on the strength merely of an 
executive decision without its being possible to regard his arrest or deten-
tion as a breach of the Convention; whereas such an assumption, with all 
39 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 37, at 117. 
40 Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34. 
41 Id. at 39. 
42 Id. at 46–53. 
43 HARRIS ET AL., supra note 37, at 117 (citation omitted). 
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its implications of arbitrary power, would lead to conclusions repugnant to 
the fundamental principles of the Convention; . . .44
Correctly interpreted, then, as the Court explained in a later case in-
volving a suspected mafioso, Article 5.1(c) does not authorize a “policy of 
general prevention directed against an individual or a category of individu-
als who, like mafiosi, present a danger on account of their continuing pro-
pensity to crime; it does no more than afford the Contracting States a means 
of preventing a concrete and specified offence.”45 Thus, while Article 5.1(c) 
may authorize “preventive detention” for purposes of criminal law enforce-
ment in regard to a particular crime, it is not relevant to “security detention” 
in the sense used here, i.e., detention for purposes of security or security-
related interrogation, not for purposes of criminal prosecution. 
2. Derogation from the ECHR right to liberty 
After rejecting security detention as a violation of the right to liber-
ty, the Court in Lawless then considered whether the detention was justified 
by virtue of the Irish government’s derogation from Article 5, and con-
cluded that it was.46
The substantive standard for derogation from the ECHR appears in 
Article 15(1): 
[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the na-
tion any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its 
obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the ex-
igencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent 
with its other obligations under international law.47
Pursuant to this provision, the Court framed the substantive ques-
tion as whether the Irish security detention measure was “strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation.”48
The Court noted that some members of the European Commission 
of Human Rights believed the security detention was not necessary because 
the Irish government instead could have utilized the alternatives of: (1) or-
dinary criminal prosecution; (2) prosecution before special criminal courts 
or before military courts; and (3)  sealing the border between Ireland and 
Northern Ireland. 
44 Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 52. 
45 Guzzardi v. Italy, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 38 (1980). 
46 Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 54–62. 
47 ECHR, supra note 14, at art. 15.1. 
48 Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 57. 
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In the Court’s view, however, none of these means was adequate to 
deal with the situation confronting Ireland in 1957. The “military, secret and 
terrorist” nature of the IRA, the fear it inspired in witnesses, and the fact 
that most of its activities were cross-border raids into Northern Ireland, 
caused “great difficulties” in gathering evidence for criminal prosecution, 
no matter the forum. Sealing the border would have imposed “extremely 
serious repercussions on the population as a whole.”49
The Court also noted that the Irish security detention law had a 
number of “safeguards designed to prevent abuses in the operation of the 
system of administrative detention.”50
The Act was subject to constant supervision by Parliament, which 
not only received detailed reports but could also, at any time, annul 
the government’s declaration triggering the emergency powers of se-
curity detention. 
A “Detention Commission” consisting of a military officer and two 
judges had been set up, which could hear complaints from detainees 
and, if its opinion was favorable to release, was binding on the gov-
ernment. 
The ordinary courts could compel the Detention Commission to car-
ry out its functions. 
The government publicly announced that it would release any detai-
nee who gave an undertaking to respect the law and the security Act, a 
government commitment which the European Court considered to be 
legally binding (and which in fact led to the release of Lawless after 
he gave such an undertaking.)51
The Court concluded that the security detention appeared to be a 
measure strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.52
In more recent cases of derogations from the right to liberty in order 
to combat terrorism, the Court has taken a more exacting approach. In 
Brannigan and McBride v. U.K. (1993),53 the Court upheld British deten-
49 Id. at 58. 
50 Id.
51 Id. at 41–42. 
52 Id. at 59. 
53 Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 38 (1993). 
The British statute there did not purport to authorize security detention in the sense used in 
this article, i.e., detention not related to criminal prosecution. Rather, the statute extended the 
time during which police could detain a suspect while gathering evidence for criminal prose-
cution. Id. at 38–40. But nothing in the Court’s opinion suggests that it would have allowed a 
longer detention, or one with fewer procedural safeguards, if there had been no connection to 
a possible criminal prosecution. Thus Brannigan’s strict scrutiny of the length and proce-
dures for police detention may be taken to apply, with at least equal force, to security deten-
tions where no criminal prosecution is contemplated. 
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tions under derogation of terrorists in Northern Ireland for periods of up to 
seven days without judicial supervision.  The Court stressed the availability 
of safeguards, especially the detainee’s access to habeas corpus, his abso-
lute and legally enforceable right of access to a solicitor within 48 hours, his 
right to inform a friend or relative of his detention, and his right to have 
access to a doctor.54
The implications of Brannigan—exacting scrutiny by the European 
Court of whether derogations from the right to liberty are “strictly required” 
by the exigencies—came to roost in Aksoy v. Turkey (1996).55  In Aksoy,
Turkey had derogated from ECHR Article 5 in order to detain terrorism 
suspects.  The Court found that a detention of fourteen days without judicial 
supervision was “exceptionally long, and left the applicant vulnerable not 
only to arbitrary interference with his right to liberty but also to torture.”  
Moreover, the Government failed to adduce any “detailed reasons as to why 
the fight against terrorism . . . rendered judicial intervention impractica-
ble.”56 Thus, while the Court in Lawless had upheld a security detention 
under derogation of five months, in Aksoy it was unwilling to uphold a de-
tention under derogation of fourteen days without judicial supervision.57
In addition to the European Court, national courts interpreting the 
ECHR now strictly enforce the restrictions on derogations from the right to 
liberty.  After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the British gov-
ernment derogated from ECHR Article 5 in order to impose prolonged secu-
rity detention on foreign nationals suspected of international terrorism who 
could not or would not be deported.58
The House of Lords considered this scheme in light of the deroga-
tion provisions of the ECHR,59 which they considered to be to the same 
54 Id. at 55. 
55 Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260, 2269. Like Brannigan, Aksoy involved 
extended police detention with a view toward possible criminal prosecution. The detention 
was thus not, strictly speaking, a “security detention” in the sense used in this article. Id. 
However, as explained in regard to Brannigan, nothing in Aksoy suggests that the European 
Court would have allowed a longer detention, or one with fewer procedural safeguards, if the 
detention had been a pure security detention, with no prospect of criminal prosecution. See
supra note 53. 
56 Id. ¶ 78.    
57 See also Demir and Others v. Turkey, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2640 [hereinafter Demir]
(16–23 days incommunicado detention without judicial supervision not justified under dero-
gation from Article 5); Nuray Sen v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment of June 17, 2003, ¶ 28 
(eleven days detention without judicial intervention not justified under derogation from Ar-
ticle 5).
58 A and Others v. Secretary of State, [2004] UKHL 56, ¶ 11. 
59 Id. ¶¶ 10, 16.    
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effect as those of the ICPR with regard to discrimination.60  Even though the 
new scheme had even more procedural safeguards than those in place in 
Lawless,61 the Law Lords adjudged that the legislation was both dispropor-
tionate and discriminatory, and hence incompatible with the ECHR.62  Pur-
suant to the Human Rights Act, the Court so advised the government.63
The core of the problem was discrimination: foreign citizens sus-
pected of international terrorism could be detained indefinitely, whereas 
British citizens could not.  If that were the only problem, the Court might 
60 Id. ¶ 47 (“The United Kingdom did not derogate from article 14 of the European Con-
vention (or from art 26 of the ICCPR, which corresponds to it.”); Id. ¶ 63 (“The Attorney 
General . . . accepted that article 14 of the European Convention and article 26 of the ICCPR 
are to the same effect.”); Id. ¶ 68 (“To do so was a violation of article 14. It was also a viola-
tion of article 26 of the ICCPR and so inconsistent with the United Kingdom's other obliga-
tions under international law within the meaning of art 15 of the European Convention.”); Id.
¶ 69(4) (“[A]rticle 4(1) of the ICCPR, in requiring that a measure introduced in derogation 
from Covenant obligations must not discriminate, does not include nationality, national ori-
gin or ‘other status’ among the forbidden grounds of discrimination: . . . However, by article 
2 of the ICCPR the states parties undertake to respect and ensure to all individuals within the 
territory the rights in the Covenant ‘without distinction of any kind, such as race . . . national 
or social origin . . . or other status.’ Similarly, article 26 guarantees equal protection against 
discrimination ‘on any ground such as race, . . .  national or social origin . . . or other status.’ 
This language is broad enough to embrace nationality and immigration status. It is open to 
states to derogate from articles 2 and 26 but the United Kingdom has not done so. If, there-
fore, as I have concluded, section 23 discriminates against the appellants on grounds of their 
nationality or immigration status, there is a breach of articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR and so a 
breach of the UK’s ‘other obligations under international law’ within the meaning of art 15 
of the European Convention.”). Article 4(1) of the ICCPR provides that, “[i]n time of public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially 
proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from 
their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations 
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, co-
lour, sex, language, religion or social origin.” ICCPR at art. 4(1). 
61 As Lord Walker, dissenting, explained,  
the 2001 Act contains several important safeguards against oppression. The exer-
cise of the Secretary of State’s powers is subject to judicial review by SIAC, an in-
dependent and impartial court, which under . . . the 2001 Act has a wide jurisdic-
tion to hear appeals, and must also review every certificate granted . . . [for security 
detention] at regular intervals. Moreover the legislation is temporary in nature. Any 
decision to prolong it is anxiously considered by the legislature. While it is in force 
there is detailed scrutiny of the operation of . . . [security detentions] by the indi-
vidual (at present Lord Carlisle QC) appointed [as ombudsman]. There is also a 
wider review by the Committee of Privy Councillors . . . . All these safeguards 
seem to me to show a genuine determination that the 2001 Act, and especially Part 
4 [on security detentions], should not be used to encroach on human rights any 
more than is strictly necessary. 
A and Others v. Secretary of State, [2004] UKHL 56, ¶ 217. 
62 A and Others v. Secretary of State, [2004] UKHL 56, ¶¶ 43, 67, 72. 
63 Id. ¶ 72. 
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simply have advised the government that it needed to provide equal treat-
ment. But the Court went further, suggesting that restrictions on liberty 
short of detention should suffice. It noted that when one of the security pris-
oners was released on bail, 
it was on condition (among other things) that he wear an electronic moni-
toring tag at all times; that he remain at his premises at all times; that he 
telephone a named security company five times each day at specified 
times; that he permit the company to install monitoring equipment at his 
premises; that he limit entry to his premises to his family, his solicitor, his 
medical attendants and other approved persons; that he make no contact 
with any other person; that he have on his premises no computer equip-
ment, mobile telephone or other electronic communications device; that he 
cancel the existing telephone link to his premises; and that he install a ded-
icated telephone link permitting contact only with the security company. 
The Appellants suggested that conditions of this kind, strictly enforced, 
would effectively inhibit terrorist activity. It is hard to see why this would 
not be so.64
When the legislation was subsequently revised, it incorporated con-
ditions of this nature. But after several detainees thus placed under house 
arrest managed to abscond, some British police continue to call for extend-
ing the maximum period of detention prior to charging terrorism suspects, 
currently 28 days, to allow for indefinite security detention.65
Whether indefinite security detention under a derogation could se-
cure judicial approval in Europe today, as opposed to in 1961 when Lawless
was decided, is thus open to some doubt. Technological change, in the form 
of electronic ankle bracelets and the like, may (or may not) have tipped the 
balance since Lawless away from security detention under derogation. 
PROCEDURES FOR SECURITY DETENTION
Where security detention is allowed at all, the procedures for its use 
must be previously established by law.66 They must also include the follow-
ing procedural safeguards:    
64 Id. ¶ 35. 
65 See Mark Townsend & Jamie Doward, Lock Terror Suspects up Indefinitely Say Police,
THE OBSERVER, July 15, 2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/jul/15/hum 
anrights.terrorism; Sarah Lyall, British Intelligence Chief Sharpens Intelligence Warning,
N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007, at A3.  By early August 2008, however, even a more modest gov-
ernment proposal to extend the twenty-eight day detention period to forty-two days faced 
significant opposition in Parliament, and its prospects of passage seemed doubtful. Alan 
Travis, Terrorism: Lords say 42-day law will put fair trials at risk, GUARDIAN (London), 
Aug. 5, 2008, at 4. 
66 ICCPR, supra note 2, at art. 9(1) (“No one shall be deprived of his liberty except . . . in 
accordance with such procedures as are established by law.”); ACHR, supra note 16, at art. 
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Judicial Control. The detention must be subject to prompt and effec-
tive judicial control,67 at least on the initiative of the detainee.  The 
detainee must be entitled to take proceedings before a court to decide 
without delay on the lawfulness of detention.68 This right is non-
derogable.69  There is arguably a gap in protection by means of judi-
                                                     
7(2) (“No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except . . . under the conditions estab-
lished beforehand by the Constitution . . . or by a law . . . .”); ACHPR, supra note 21, at art. 6 
(“No one shall be deprived of his freedom except for . . . conditions previously laid down by 
law.”); ADHR, supra note 18, at art. 25 (“No person may be deprived of his liberty except     
. . . according to the procedures established by pre-existing law.”); Body of Principles, supra
note 12, at principle 2 (“[D]etention . . . shall only be carried out strictly in accordance with 
the provisions of the law and by competent officials or persons authorized for that pur-
pose.”). Although as noted in the preceding text, the ECHR does not allow security detention 
except, perhaps, by derogation. The ECHR states generally, “[n]o one shall be deprived of 
his liberty save . . . in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.” ECHR, supra note
14, at art. 5.1. In view of the emphasis in Lawless on the procedural “safeguards” for the 
Irish security detention under derogation from Article 5, one might expect the European 
Court, if it were to allow a security detention under derogation today, to require that it be 
done pursuant to a procedure prescribed by law. Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
at 62 (1961). 
67 ACHR, supra note 16, at art. 7(5) (“Any person detained shall be brought promptly 
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be 
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released . . . .”); Body of Principles, supra
note 12, at principle 4 (“Any form of detention or imprisonment and all measures affecting 
the human rights of a person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be ordered 
by, or be subject to the effective control of, a judicial or other authority.”); Body of Prin-
ciples, supra note 12, at principle 11(1) (“A person shall not be kept in detention without 
being given an effective opportunity to be heard promptly by a judicial or other authority.”); 
Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principle 11(3) (“A judicial or other authority shall be 
empowered to review as appropriate the continuance of detention.”). 
68 See ICCPR, supra note 2, at art. 9(4) (“Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest 
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may 
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release of the detention 
is not lawful.”).  This provision, i.e., “the right to control by a court of the legality of the 
detention, applies to all persons deprived of their liberty by arrest or detention.”  HRC GC 8, 
supra note 1, ¶ 1.  Provisions similar to ICCPR art. 9(4) include ACHR art. 7(6), ADHR art. 
25, and ECHR art. 5(4). See also Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principle 11(1) (“A 
person shall not be kept in detention without being given an effective opportunity to be heard 
promptly by a judicial or other authority.”); Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principle 
32(1) ( “A detained person or his counsel shall be entitled at any time to take proceedings 
according to domestic law before a judicial or other authority to challenge the lawfulness of 
his detention in order to obtain his release without delay, if it is unlawful.”). The ACHPR is 
less explicit but does provide generally that every individual has the “right to an appeal to 
competent national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights . . . .” ACHPR, 
supra note 21, at 7(1).  
69 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Ar-
ticle 4), ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter HRC GC 
29] (“In order to protect non-derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to 
enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be dimi-
nished by a State party’s decision to derogate from the Covenant.”); ACHR, supra note 16, at 
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cial control, insofar as IHRL treaties do not expressly mandate period-
ic judicial review of detention, or right to counsel.  However, they 
may reasonably be interpreted to require periodic judicial review.70
Notice of Reasons and Consular Rights.  The detaining authorities 
must inform the detainee of the reasons for her detention71 and, if she 
is foreign, of her right to communicate with her consulate for assis-
tance.72
Communications.  The detention must not be incommunicado for 
more than a few days.73 The prisoner should be entitled to communi-
cate with family and counsel.74
                                                     
art. 27(2) (listing, in addition to other non-derogable rights such as the right to life and to 
humane treatment, “the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights”).  The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights identifies habeas corpus as one of those non-
derogable judicial guarantees.” Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
Advisory Opinion, OC-9/87 (Jan. 30, 1987). 
70 See Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principle 11(3) (“A judicial or other authority 
shall be empowered to review as appropriate the continuance of detention.”); See Report on 
Terrorism and Human Rights, supra note 31, ¶ 124 (“Detention in such circumstances must 
also be subject to supervisory judicial control without delay and, in instances when the state 
has justified continuing detention, at reasonable intervals.”). 
71 ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 9(2) (“Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the 
time of his arrest, of the reasons for his arrest . . . .”); see also HRC GC 8, supra note 1, ¶ 1 
(showing that 9(2) is applicable to all deprivations of liberty); ACHR, supra note 18, at art. 
7(4) ( “Anyone who is detained shall be informed promptly of the reasons for his deten-
tion.”); Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principle 10 (“Anyone who is arrested shall be 
informed at the time of his arrest of the reason for his arrest . . . .”). 
72 Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principle 16(2) (“If a detained or imprisoned per-
son is a foreigner, he shall also be promptly informed of his right to communicate by appro-
priate means with a consular post or the diplomatic mission of the State of which he is a 
national or which is otherwise entitled to receive such communication in accordance with 
international law or with the representative of the competent international organization, if he 
is a refugee or is otherwise under the protection of an intergovernmental organization.”). See
also La Grand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 515 (June 27); The Right to Information on 
Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advi-
sory Opinion, 1999 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 16 (Oct. 1, 1999). 
73 Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principle 15 ( “Notwithstanding the exceptions 
contained in principle 16, paragraph 4, and principle 18, paragraph 3, communication of the 
detained or imprisoned person with the outside world, and in particular his family or counsel, 
shall not be denied for more than a matter of days.”).  The exceptions referenced provide as 
follows: Id. at principle 16(4) (“Any notification referred to in the present principle [such as 
to consular authorities] shall be made or permitted to be made without delay. The competent 
authority may however delay a notification for a reasonable period where exceptional needs 
of the investigation so require.”); Id. at principle 18(3) (“The right of a detained or impri-
soned person to be visited by and to consult and communicate, without delay or censorship 
and in full confidentiality, with his legal counsel may not be suspended or restricted save in 
exceptional circumstances, to be specified by law or lawful regulations, when it is considered 
indispensable by a judicial or other authority in order to maintain security and good order.”). 
See also Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 187 (July 29, 
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Registration.  The detention must be registered.75  There must be no 
“prisoners without a name in cells without a number.”76
Fair Judicial Hearing.  The hearing in which a detainee contests the 
lawfulness of his detention must be fair and presumptively public, be-
fore an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.77  A 
fair hearing affording due process of law must, at minimum, afford a 
security detainee “notice of the factual basis for his classification, and 
a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before 
a neutral decisionmaker.”78  Arguably it must also ensure the right to 
counsel for the detainee.79
                                                     
1988) (“The mere subjection of an individual to prolonged isolation and deprivation of 
communication is in itself cruel and inhuman treatment which harms the psychological and 
moral integrity of the person, and violates the right of every detainee . . . to treatment res-
pectful of his dignity.”). 
74 Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principle 19 (stating that “[a] detained or impri-
soned person shall have the right to be visited by and to correspond with, in particular, mem-
bers of his family and shall be given adequate opportunity to communicate with the outside 
world, subject to reasonable conditions and restrictions as specified by law or lawful regula-
tions”).
75 “The prohibitions against … unacknowledged detention are not subject to derogation. 
The absolute nature of these prohibitions, even in times of emergency, is justified by their 
status as norms of general international law.” HRC GC 29, supra note 69, ¶ 13(b). The Body 
of Principles provides: “1. There shall be duly recorded: (a) The reasons for the arrest; 
(b) The time of the arrest and the taking of the arrested person to a place of custody as well 
as that of his first appearance before a judicial or other authority; (c) The identity of the law 
enforcement officials concerned; (d) Precise information concerning the place of custody. 
2. Such records shall be communicated to the detained person, or his counsel, if any, in the 
form prescribed by law.” Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principle 12.   
76 See JACOBO TIMERMAN, PRISONER WITHOUT A NAME, CELL WITHOUT A NUMBER (Toby 
Talbot trans., 1982). 
77 ICCPR, supra note 2, at art. 14(1); ECHR, supra note 14, at art. 6(1); ACHR, supra 
note 18, at art. 18(1); ACHPR, supra note 21, at art. 7(1). 
78 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004); see also Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 
F.3d 213, 216 (per curiam), 262–76 (Traxler, J., concurring) (4thCir. 2008) (en banc) (re-
manding habeas petition brought by alleged terrorist detained as enemy combatant, for fur-
ther proceedings in which government must present best available evidence and allow detai-
nee to confront and question witnesses against him, unless government can show that such 
additional process would be impractical, unduly burdensome or would harm national securi-
ty, and requiring government on remand to bear burden of proof), cert. filed, Sept. 19, 2008. 
79 Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principle 17 (“1. A detained person shall be en-
titled to have the assistance of a legal counsel. He shall be informed of his right by the com-
petent authority promptly after arrest and shall be provided with reasonable facilities for 
exercising it. 2. If a detained person does not have a legal counsel of his own choice, he shall 
be entitled to have a legal counsel assigned to him by a judicial or other authority in all cases 
where the interests of justice so require and without payment by him if he does not have 
sufficient means to pay.”). The Inter-American Court has advised that the circumstances of a 
case such as “its significance, its legal character, and its context in a particular legal system 
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Beyond the foregoing procedural requirements, the U.N. Body of 
Principles envisions an additional safeguard.  “In order to supervise the 
strict observance of relevant laws and regulations, places of detention shall 
be visited regularly by qualified and experienced persons appointed by, and 
responsible to, a competent authority distinct from the authority directly in 
charge of the administration of the place of detention or imprisonment.”80
EXTENT OF SECURITY DETENTION
The detention must be proportional; it must be no more restrictive 
or prolonged than strictly required by the exigencies of the security situa-
tion. If this is true of security detention by derogation from the right to liber-
ty,81 a fortiori it must apply as well to security detention where there has 
been no derogation. 
EQUAL TREATMENT OF SECURITY DETAINEES
Any security detention must be non-discriminatory,82 including as 
between citizens and foreigners.83
HUMANE TREATMENT OF SECURITY DETAINEES
The treatment of the detainee must be humane and must not subject 
him to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.84
Humane treatment includes regular access to medical care.85
                                                     
—are among the factors that bear on the determination of whether legal representation is or 
is not necessary for a fair hearing.” Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies,
Advisory Opinion, 1990 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 11, ¶ 28 (Aug. 10, 1990). Few cir-
cumstances could be more significant for a detainee than a hearing on whether he may law-
fully be detained indefinitely.  Thus, the right to counsel is arguably an essential element of a 
fair hearing. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539. 
80 Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principle 29(1). 
81 See A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, ¶¶ 30–44; see 
also HRC GC 29, supra note 69, ¶ 4 (noting that the proportionality limitation applies to the 
“duration, geographical coverage and material scope of the state of emergency and any 
measures of derogation”). 
82 ICCPR, supra note 2, at arts. 2(1), 26; ACHR, supra note 16, at arts. 1(1), 24; ADHR, 
supra note 18, at art. 2; ACHPR, supra note 21, at art. 20; Body of Principles, supra note 12, 
at principle 5(1). 
83 See A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, ¶¶ 45–69; see 
also HRC GC 29, supra note 69, ¶ 8. 
84 ICCPR, supra note 2, at arts. 7, 10(1); ECHR, supra note 14, at art. 3; ACHR, supra 
note 16, at art. 5; ADHR, supra note 18, at arts. 1, 25; ACHPR, supra note 21, at art. 20; 
Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principles 1, 6. 
85 Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principle 24. 
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COMPENSATION FOR UNLAWFUL DETENTION
Detainees unlawfully detained have a right to be compensated.86
OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Since other provisions of international law must be complied with 
even under derogation,87 the same requirement applies to security detention 
generally.  The principal body of law that may thus be applicable is Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, to the extent security detention is used in the con-
text of armed conflict.  In such cases both IHRL and the lex specialis of IHL 
apply.88 The specific modalities by which both bodies of law may be ap-
plied are beyond the scope of this survey of IHRL. 
CONCLUSION
Except in the member states of the Council of Europe, where secu-
rity detention is allowed, if at all, only by derogation from the right to liber-
ty, IHRL allows security detention subject to certain conditions. Under 
IHRL, security dentition is allowed provided that it is neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory, is based on grounds and procedures previously established 
by law that meet minimum procedural requirements, does not entail inhu-
man treatment of detainees, and is no more restrictive of liberty or long-
lasting than required to meet the exigencies of security. In addition, unlaw-
fully detained persons have a right to be compensated, and the detention 
must also comply with other provisions of international law where applica-
ble, in particular with IHL. 
IHRL would do well to follow the European model, which permits 
security detention, if at all, only by derogation. That approach makes clear 
that security detention is an extraordinary device to be used only in excep-
tional circumstances. The formalities of having to declare and defend states 
of emergency in order to derogate also ensure that conscious, visible atten-
tion by government officials, lawmakers and judges will focus on whether 
there is truly a need for security detention in a given situation, and later on 
whether the exigencies truly continue. 
86 ICCPR, supra note 2, at art. 9(5); ACHR, supra note 16; ECHR, supra note 14, at art. 
5(5); see also Body of Principles, supra note 12, at principle 35(1) (“Damage incurred be-
cause of acts or omissions by a public official contrary to the rights contained in these prin-
ciples shall be compensated according to the applicable rules or liability provided by domes-
tic law.”). 
87 ICCPR, supra note 2, at art. 4(1); ECHR, supra note 14, at art. 15(1); ACHR, supra 
note 17, at art. 27(1). In contrast, the ACHPR as no derogation provision. See ACHPR, supra 
note 21. 
88 See ICJ Wall, supra note 23, ¶ 106. 
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Whether security detention is done under the European model—
only by derogation (if at all)— or is authorized without derogation, as cur-
rently allowed by IHRL generally, two central questions merit further con-
sideration.  First, what is the legal standard and evidentiary basis required to 
justify security detention?  Given the fundamental liberty interests at stake 
in a prolonged detention, one might suggest a fairly high standard both as to 
the law and as to the evidentiary basis.  Second, should security detention be 
allowed at all?  Even if one takes the view that the criminal justice systems 
cannot cope with all security threats, is imprisonment always—or ever— 
necessary?  Might a system of alternative restraints, including house arrest, 
electronic ankle bracelets and the other devices used in recent years in Brit-
ain, suffice?  Acknowledging that some suspects have nonetheless managed 
to escape those restraints, can the devices be fine-tuned to be more effi-
cient? 
If security detention is to be allowed at all, it must be only with the 
greatest caution and restraint.  Granting executive officials authority, on the 
basis of secret intelligence information and subject only to limited judicial 
review, to deprive persons of their liberty based on grounds of “security,” is 
dangerous to liberty and to the rule of law.  In many countries, political dis-
sidents may be deemed security threats.  Even in democracies under the rule 
of law, zealous officials may be too quick to conclude, on the basis of shaky 
intelligence information, that someone is a security threat.  If security deten-
tion is not prohibited altogether, its use must be kept to an absolute mini-
mum, and subjected to rigorous and redundant procedural safeguards. 
